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Abstract: The charging of school user fees is a much-debated policy issue in developing 
countries. In this paper, I evaluate the impact of a South African fee elimination program 
that was targeted at the poorest two quintiles of schools based on a community poverty 
score. Fixed effects estimates find that the program increased enrollment by almost 2% in 
treated secondary schools, an increase concentrated in earlier secondary grades. There is 
substantial heterogeneity in the estimated secondary school effect: it is driven entirely by 
an increase of around 3.5% in the poorer of the two treated quintiles. Regression 
discontinuity estimates confirm that the relatively wealthy schools near the treatment 
cutoff did not experience any effects on enrollment. Overall, the abolition of fees seems 
to have been reasonably effective in increasing secondary school enrollment in 
particularly poor communities. This is despite the fact that the eliminated fees were 
relatively low, comprising only around 1.5% of annual household income (per child) in 
these communities. 
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1. Introduction 
Many developing countries continue to charge fees to students attending public schools. 
Considerable concern has been expressed that such fees may represent a barrier to school 
enrollment, lowering investment in human capital and reducing economic growth. School fees 
may be especially damaging for poor households, which are more likely to be credit constrained 
and to fall into an intergenerational poverty trap due to the high costs of schooling (see for 
example Barham et al., 1995)1.  
Motivated by these concerns, some developing countries have recently adopted policies 
to eliminate school fees, predominantly in primary education2. However, the impact of these 
programs on enrollment has rarely been studied using anything more than a simple before-after 
comparison of total enrollment figures. In part this reflects that these programs have involved the 
simultaneous country-wide elimination of fees, making other identification strategies difficult to 
implement3. As a result, there is still a paucity of well-identified evidence on the quantitative 
impact of such large-scale fee elimination programs. 
                                                 
1 On the other hand, others present arguments in favor of school fees, mainly that they can improve quality by 
increasing available resources and by providing incentives for parental monitoring. For a summary of this debate see 
Hillman and Jenkner (2002) and Reddy and Vandemoortele (1996).  
2 In Africa alone examples of countries that have eliminated primary school fees include Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Ghana. In general the initiatives in these low-income countries seem to have 
been accompanied by sudden and dramatic increases in enrollment, often at the cost of severe overcrowding and 
reduced quality (UNICEF, 2006). 
3 An exception is Fafchamps and Minten’s (2007) study on Madagascar, in which a civil conflict led to arguably 
exogenous geographical variation in the implementation of the fee elimination. 
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In order to contribute such evidence, this paper investigates the impact on enrollment of a 
unique targeted national fee elimination initiative in South Africa, under which some 40% of 
public school students have benefited from the abolition of fees. Specifically, schools were first 
divided into national quintiles using a poverty score based on the poverty of the surrounding 
community. The poorest two quintiles of schools were then declared “no-fee”, a status which 
required them to eliminate school fees on a mandatory basis starting in the 2007 academic year. 
I evaluate the impact of this program using two empirical approaches to analyze data on 
public school enrollment in South Africa. The first is a standard fixed effects (FE) estimator that 
takes advantage of the panel structure of the data to identify the treatment effect. This strategy 
produces little evidence of any impact on enrollment at the primary level. In contrast, it suggests 
that the program increased national secondary school enrollment by almost 2 percentage points, 
driven by an increase in the earlier secondary school grades. This may reflect that secondary 
enrollment started from a lower base than primary enrollment, which was already high in South 
Africa prior to this initiative. In addition, the initial median secondary fee was more than double 
the median primary fee, so that the fee elimination entailed a greater cost reduction in secondary 
schools. The program also does not appear to have caused substantial student migration from 
fee-charging to no-fee schools, so that the impact on secondary enrollment likely occurred 
through the enrollment of children who would otherwise have been out of school. 
The evidence suggests that the average secondary school impact estimated by FE masks 
important heterogeneities in the treatment effect. Specifically, it is the schools in the poorer of 
the treated communities - where sensitivity to school fees is likely to be highest - that experience 
positive treatment effects. Of the two bottom quintiles of schools that were treated, the national 
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secondary school effect is almost entirely concentrated in the poorest quintile where enrollment 
increased by almost 3.5%. In the other, wealthier, treated quintile, the effect is near zero.  
To confirm the lack of a treatment effect in the less poor of the treated schools I use a second 
empirical approach, a regression discontinuity (RD) design, which is feasible because data on the 
exact poverty score awarded to each school were obtained for a single large province. This 
allows me to take advantage of the sharp discontinuity in treatment status around the treatment 
cutoff poverty score that separates schools in quintiles 2 and 3. If the treatment effect is 
concentrated in the poorer of the treated schools, RD estimates are likely to find zero program 
effects since they are only valid locally for the relatively wealthy schools close to the cutoff.  
Indeed, the RD estimates suggest that the program had virtually no effect on enrollment 
in either primary or secondary schools. In contrast, applying the FE estimator to the same 
provincial sample finds that the program increased secondary enrollment by almost 6 percentage 
points in the poorer of the two treated quintiles. Consistent with the findings for the national 
sample, this suggests that enrollment increases were concentrated in the poorer communities far 
from the treatment cutoff score. Overall these results imply that the elimination of the relatively 
modest pre-existing school fees was effective in increasing secondary school enrollment, but 
only in the poorer of the treated communities.  
The decision to target this program at schools serving poor communities is in contrast to 
the recent fee elimination programs in many lower-income countries that have involved 
scrapping fees across the board. The alternative of targeting such a program at the poor allows 
the government to allocate school funding progressively by relying on parents to continue to 
meet much of the costs of schooling in wealthier communities. In the context of conditional cash 
transfer programs, Morley and Coady (2003) suggest that a geographical method of targeting 
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such as the one described here may be especially appropriate for middle income countries like 
South Africa in which inequality is high and poor communities are spatially distinct from 
wealthy ones, so that they can be easily identified for targeting.  
Another alternative is to target fee reduction at the household level, an example of which 
is the Gratuidad intervention in Colombia evaluated by Barrera-Osorio, Linden and Urquiola 
(2007). This program provided various levels of fee reductions to families based on their poverty 
score from a household survey, lending itself to an RD design. Suggestive of the results here, 
different effects are found by poverty level and for primary and secondary enrollment. However, 
there are potential problems associated with targeting at the household level. These include the 
potentially high costs of identifying poor households and verifying eligibility, the existence of 
perverse incentives to gain or retain eligibility and potential intra-community conflict between 
those selected for and those excluded from treatment. In fact, the introduction of the 
geographically targeted no-fee program in South Africa was partly motivated by the problems 
experienced with the household means-based system of fee exemptions that was in place prior to 
the program. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the no-fee 
program, including some background on schooling in South Africa. Section 3 discusses the 
identification strategies for evaluating the program, while section 4 describes the data and 
presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the FE results and some evidence on 
heterogeneous effects for the national sample. Section 6 investigates the existence and 
implications of heterogeneous treatment effects for the provincial sample, including the results 
from the RD design. Section 7 concludes.   
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2. The no-fee program 
a. Background: schooling and school fees in South Africa 
Schooling in South Africa consists of 12 grades of which the first 7 constitute primary school. 
Education is officially compulsory until grade 9, although this has rarely been enforced. The vast 
majority of students attend public school: the private sector is growing but still accounts for 
under 3% of enrollments (Department of Education, 2006a). The national Gross Enrollment Rate 
(GER) in 2005 was 103% for primary school, 89% for secondary school and 82% for the post-
compulsory phase of secondary school, grades 10-12 (Department of Education, 2006b)4. As one 
of the few middle income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is not surprising that these 
enrollment rates are far higher than those typical of the region.  
The fundamental piece of education-related legislation in the post-apartheid era is the 
South African Schools Act (SASA) of 1996. Its stated aim is to “provide for a uniform system 
for the organization, governance and financing of schools”. Under the SASA, School Governing 
Bodies (SGB’s) must be constituted in each school, consisting of the principal as well as elected 
representatives of teachers, students (in secondary schools) and parents. The exact composition 
of the SGB can vary, but parents must retain an absolute majority. The precise functions of the 
SGB also vary by school. Schools can apply for “section 21” status that gives the SGB full 
control over its budgetary allocation from the education department. However, all SGB’s have 
                                                 
4 The GER is simply the number of students enrolled as a fraction of the number of school-age children in the 
population. It can be over 100% if there are many underage or overage children enrolled. The Net Enrollment Ratio 
(NER) is the number of school-age children enrolled as a fraction of the number of school-age children in the 
population. The Department of Education does not publish NER estimates, but figures available from the World 
Bank suggest that the 2005 NER was 86% for primary school and 72% for secondary school (World Bank, 2009).  
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power over individual teacher appointments (subject to the number of posts granted by the 
education department), language policy, admissions policy and the right to set fees.  
In fact, the charging of school fees where appropriate is encouraged by the act, which 
exhorts SGB’s to take “all reasonable measures” to supplement their funding from the state in 
order to improve quality. However, the act is also explicit that fees may not be imposed on 
parents who cannot afford to pay them. The provision of exemptions for parents who cannot 
afford fees has been set out in subsequent government notices that mandate partial or full fee 
exemptions based on the relative size of household income and school fees. Despite these 
provisions, anecdotal evidence from media reports and speeches from Department of Education 
officials suggests that fee exemptions are not operating as intended. One of the main problems is 
that the government does not compensate schools for fee exemptions, so that any exemption 
granted effectively means a lower amount of per-student funding. There is therefore an incentive 
for SGB’s to avoid fulfilling their obligation to inform parents of their right to an exemption and 
to exert significant pressure on parents to pay fees even when they are eligible for an 
exemption5.  
b. School poverty scores and quintiles 
The Education Laws Amendment Act of 2005 laid the foundation for the quintile-based 
declaration of no-fee schools that is the subject of this study. Subsequent guidelines published by 
the Department of Education clarified the basic procedure to be followed in order to classify 
schools into poverty quintiles. According to the guidelines, schools are to be awarded a poverty 
                                                 
5 The media has reported on several instances where SGB’s have attempted to seize the assets of parents who have 
not paid fees (see for example Stolley, 2005, and Macfarlane, 2007). Pressure on parents to pay fees may also arise 
through the (illegal) withholding of report cards and examination results of students who have not paid. 
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score based solely on the poverty of the surrounding community. The exact determination of the 
score is to be performed by the nine individual provincial departments, using the following basic 
approach. First, schools are to be linked to a certain geographical area such as an electoral voting 
ward. Then, variables from the latest census are to be selected to reflect average income, 
unemployment and the level of education/literacy in that area. Finally, these variables are to be 
weighted in some way to arrive at a final score. All schools within a certain small geographical 
area are therefore assigned the same score that is meant to reflect the poverty of the community 
served by these schools. It should be emphasized that the national legislation only sets out this 
bas
                                                
ic framework: the final determination of poverty scores is up to the individual provinces.  
In practice, a poverty index (“deprivation index”) at the electoral ward level devised by 
Noble et al. (2006) was made available to provincial education departments in order to assist 
with them with the assignment of poverty scores6. Wildeman (2008) interviewed education 
department officials in all nine provinces (anonymously), and reports that most provincial 
departments made some use of this deprivation index in their score assignments. However, some 
provinces also felt that the ward was too crude a geographical level for the purpose of assigning 
scores and/or that the indices for some wards were outdated since they were using data from 
2001. They therefore tended to make many of their own adjustments before arriving at the final 
 
6 This “Provincial Index of Multiple Deprivation” for each electoral ward in the country was obtained by combining 
data on 13 variables from the 2001 census variables into 5 “domains” of deprivation covering income, employment, 
health, education and living environment. Within a province, wards were ranked by their score in each of these five 
domains. A transformation was then applied, using each ward’s rank in a particular domain to arrive at a new 
domain score with a common support across domains. These scores were then averaged to obtain the final 
deprivation index for each ward. Since the transformations were carried out using the within province ranking, the 
final index is not comparable across provinces. 
 7
scores, using additional local knowledge of schools and locations to distinguish between schools 
within a ward. For example, Wildeman reports that one province used the deprivation index as a 
component in its own formula while another made adjustments to the score if there was a 
discrepancy with a pre-existing provincial poverty ranking. Fortunately, communication with 
officials from the Eastern Cape confirmed that this province assigned poverty scores directly 
using the provided deprivation index. This is important because the Eastern Cape is the province 
for whi
rovince, 
hat 34.8% of students fall into the lowest quintile.  
                                                
ch the actual poverty scores are used in the subsequent RD analysis. 
Once a province has assigned poverty scores it is then to establish poverty score cutoffs 
to enable it to classify schools according to national quintiles. This classification is performed 
using a “poverty distribution table” that was drawn up by the national government based on 
census household income data (Table 1). For example, the Western Cape is a relatively wealthy 
province, with only 6.5% of households in the province falling into the bottom national income 
quintile. Therefore, after ranking schools by their poverty score, enrollment data should be used 
to set the first provincial cutoff in such a way that 6.5% of students in the province are placed in 
the bottom national quintile. On the other hand, the Eastern Cape is a relatively poor p
where the first cutoff should ensure t
c. Declaration of “no-fee” schools 
In 2006, schools in the bottom national quintile were invited to adopt “no-fee” status7 on a 
voluntary basis, with individual provinces free to decide on an appropriate allocation to make up 
for the loss in schools fees. However, it is unclear to what extent the policy was implemented in 
 
7 In South Africa public schools are only meant to charge a single flat fee – separate administrative or registration 
fees are prohibited by law. “No-fee” status therefore eliminates the requirement to pay any fee at all for attending 
school, although parents are still responsible for other costs such as uniforms. 
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2006, both because of its voluntary nature and because of initial doubts over whether the 
legislation would be passed in time. As a result of the latter, many provincial departments were 
not completely prepared for its implementation and struggled to identify eligible schools and 
overnment to be sufficient to 
stain a school in the absence of any income from school fees10.  
                                                
obtain the required budgetary allocation until well into the academic year, if at all. 
  Implementation of the program changed for the 2007 academic year, by which time 
provincial departments were well prepared for it. For this year, the policy was made mandatory 
and was extended so that schools in the bottom two national quintiles were declared “no-fee”8. A 
minimum per-student budgetary allocation was also specified at the national level in order to 
compensate schools for lost fees, with the allocation varying by quintile so that poorer schools 
received a higher per-student non-personnel allocation. Evidence from provincial budgets 
suggests that this additional component to the education budget was indeed provided for in 
20079. Particularly for schools in the no-fee quintiles, this allocation represented a substantial 




8 Since it contained so few schools in the bottom two quintiles, the Western Cape province decided to extend no-fee 
status to the bottom three quintiles. 
9 Provincial governments are prohibited from raising their own revenue and instead are funded by a bulk allocation 
from the national budget. However, provincial governments have ultimate responsibility for the administration of 
the education system, including drawing up and disbursing their own education budgets subject to certain 
constraints.  
10 There may be a concern that schools deliberately inflated their reported enrollment figures after the introduction 
of the program in order to benefit from this increased funding. However, the fact that I find that the program had 
little effect in primary schools argues against this, since this incentive was also in place for primary schools.  
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 3. Identification strategies 
If treatment with no-fee status had been randomly assigned, a simple comparison of enrollment 
in treated and untreated schools would yield an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of the 
treatment. Since this was not the case, treated and untreated schools are likely to be quite 
different from one another on average and a simple comparison of enrollment is likely to reflect 
many factors other than the impact of the no-fee program. Two main approaches will be used to 
mitigate this problem and identify the causal effect of the program on enrollment for different 
groups 
reated schools. A more formal 
entification strategies is presented below. 
of schools.  
First, since panel data are available for each school, one can eliminate the impact of any 
school characteristic that is fixed over time using a fixed effects (FE) estimator. At the same 
time, one can attempt to control as best as possible for other pre-existing trends in enrollment 
that may be confounded with the estimated treatment effect. The basic estimates obtained are an 
average treatment effect for the entire group of treated schools. The second approach is to note 
that treatment status was determined by a discontinuous function of the province-specific poverty 
score: schools beyond a certain score cutoff were declared no-fee. This suggests the use of a 
regression discontinuity (RD) design, which attributes any discrete change in the level of 2007 
enrollment at the cutoff to the causal effect of the treatment. In contrast to the FE estimates, the 
RD estimates are only valid locally for the limited group of treated schools near the treatment 
cutoff between quintiles 2 and 3, which are the least poor of the t
discussion of the two id
a. Fixed Effects (FE)  
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The FE estimator effectively uses the group of untreated schools as the com arison group for 
treate  s
p
d chools and makes use of the panel structure of the data to eliminate unobserved fixed 
effects. Consider the following reduced form expression for log enrollment, itY ,  in school i  in 
year t : 
itiittit ZtY treaδ υφγμα ++++=        (1)   
Where tμ  is a vector of time fixed effects and iZ  is a vector of observed school fixed effects. 
The variable ittreat is a dummy for experiencing a no- licy in year t : fee po δ  is th cient of 
terest. Since the paper focuses on the treatment effect in 2007, the first year of mandatory and 
uniform application of the program, we can replace  ittreat  with the interaction 2007*iI  where 
iI  is a
e coeffi
in
m is unity for schools that were 11. 
Effecti fy
 du my that treated in 2007 (those in quintiles 1 and 2)
vely we are identi ing the treatment effect as a shock to enrollment in treated schools in 
2007. 
The error term itυ  in equation (1) can be thought of as itiit c ευ += , where ic  are 
unobserved fixed effects and itε  are unobserved time-varying effects. Estimating δ  in equation 
                                                 
11 Although all quintile 1 schools were meant to be eligible for treatment in 2006, the program was voluntary. In 
theory I could therefore also estimate a separate 2006 treatment effect and interpret it as an intention to treat (ITT) 
estimate, despite the fact that I do not have any information on which schools (even as a proportion of the total) 
were actually treated in 2006. These estimates suggest a small and marginally significant effect of around 1.3% in 
quintile 1 schools. However, the ITT interpretation is complicated by the fact that it is unclear whether provincial 
departments succeeded in identifying their quintile 1 schools on time and whether the necessary funding was made 
available in 2006. In that sense we cannot identify the schools that were actually made eligible for the program in its 
intended form. Since these 2006 estimates do not have a clear interpretation and are therefore of limited value from 
a policy perspective, the focus in the paper is entirely on the 2007 treatment.  
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(1) by O edLS will be bias  if there is a relationship between 2007*iI  and either of the 
components of itυ . The FE estimator deals with the potential correlation between ic  and 
2007*iI  by eliminating ic  through a “within” transformation of the data. Each variable is 
differenced by its ular school over the entire period of observation and OLS 
is then applied to these transformed variables. The estimate of 
 mean f hat particor t
δ  is then consis nt under the 
assumption that 0),2 07*cov( =itiI
te
0 ε  for all }2007...,2003{ ,∈t , the period covered by the data. 
This implies zero covariance between the tra  and nsformed versions of` 2007*iI itε , resulting in 
a consistent estimate of δ . With the FE estimator, δ  is identified purely from within school 
variation in enrollment over time. 
b. Regression discontinuity (RD) approach 
The intuition behind the RD approach is that, while the no-fee schools are likely to be quite 
different from other schools on average, schools in the vicinity of the treatment-determining 
cutoff score should be similar to one another in all characteristics other than treatment status. If 
this assumption holds then schools just below the cutoff can be used as a comparison group for 
those just above. More formally, if baseline enrollment and all other characteristics affecting 
enrollment are continuous in the poverty score a  tht e cutoff, then any discrete change in the level 
of 2007 enrollment at the cutoff can be attributed to the causal effect of the treatment. We can 
therefore write the treatment effect in province j , jT , as: 
]|[lim]|[lim]|)0()1([ 2007,2007,2007, xYExXYEsXYET ijtijsxijtijsxjijtijj jj2007,
XY tij =−===−= =↑=↓=   
          (2) 
where )( ijtijt IY  denotes the log of enrollment in school i  in province 
=
j  in year t , ijtI  is a binary 
indicator for treatment, ijX  denotes the poverty score and js  is the poverty score cutoff beyond 
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which schools in the province are treated. The subscript j  is introduced to emphasize that each 
province is responsible for the final assignment of pov y scores and uses its own cutoff for 
divisio
ne also needs to account for the possibility that the poverty 
score may be correlated with enrollment aside from tment. An 
ert
n into quintiles. For this study, the necessary poverty score data and cutoffs were only 
obtained for a single large province, the Eastern Cape.  
In a regression framework, o
 its role in determining trea
appropriate specification would be: 
2007,2007,2007,2007, ( =<== ) +−++= js + tijtijijtijtij ZXfIY ωθβα    (3) 
where (.)f  is a smooth function of the score and 2007, <tijZ  is a vector of predetermined covariates 
such as lagged log enrollment ( 2006, =tijY ), the lagged student-teacher ratio and regional dummies 
am ngst others. The covariates are important for reducing bias as one uses observations further 
away from the cutoff and for improving the precision of the estimates. The coefficient of interest 
is 
o
β , the difference at the discontinuity. A well known point is that this treatment effect is valid 
only for the sub-population in the vicinity of the cutoff. If treatment effects are heterogeneous 
far from the cutoff could experience very different treatment and vary by poverty score, schools 
effects. Estimates presented later suggest that this is indeed the case and is a serious issue here.  
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
Each of the nine provinces of South Africa has its own Education Management Information 
Systems (EMIS) unit that maintains a database on all educational institutions in that province. 
Data from the provincial units are then forwarded to the EMIS unit at the national Department of 
Education, which collates all the data into a single database. School information on the 
provincial EMIS databases is updated through two major annual surveys completed by school 
principals. The first is the Snap survey that is conducted on the 10th day of the academic year and 
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collects basic information on students and teachers such as enrollment numbers. The information 
on enrollments from the Snap survey is used for allocating the budget to schools each year. The 
second survey is the Annual Survey of Schools that is conducted every year in March or April12. 
It collects far more detailed information on students and teachers than the Snap survey such as a 
subject-wise breakdown of student numbers and information on the SGB and school 
infrastr
haracteristics such as the apartheid-era racial classification of the school or whether it 
is urba
e 
                                                
ucture. However, since this survey is relatively lengthy and complex there are often 
problems experienced in obtaining fully completed surveys from schools. 
Data on the poverty quintile for the universe of public schools in seven of the nine 
provinces were obtained from the national EMIS database, together with annual data on 
enrollments by grade and gender and the number of teachers from 2003 to 2007. Data on the 
level of school fees are also available, but were last collected in 2005. Detailed information on 
the location of each school was also obtained from the database, together with some information 
on school c
n or rural. Further details on the sample composition are available in section a of the 
appendix.  
As mentioned, data on the precise poverty score awarded to each school could only be 
obtained for a single province, namely the Eastern Cape province. This is the third largest of the 
nine provinces by population and one of the poorest (see Table 1). It also has the largest number 
of public schools of any province in the country and the second largest number of enrolled 
students (Department of Education, 2006b). The poverty scores and cutoffs for allocation into 
national quintiles were obtained from a spreadsheet provided by the provincial Department of 
Education. There are 573 unique poverty scores for 5048 ordinary schools in the Eastern Cap
 




2001 census indicates that, for the median household in each school targeted by the no-fee 
program, school fees amounted to 0.5% (primary schools) and 1.5% (secondary schools) of 
                                                
, with poorer schools receiving a higher score. For the purposes of this paper, the scores 
have been normalized so that they represent standard deviations from a no-fee cutoff of zero.   
Selected descriptive statistics for the national sample of schools are provided in Table 2, 
presented separately for primary schools (panel A) and secondary schools (panel B). This 
distinction proves convenient and will be followed throughout the paper. Table 2 shows that 
schools in higher poverty quintiles – those located in more prosperous communities – tend to 
consist of a greater proportion of secondary schools than those in lower quintiles (panel B). This 
reflects the general neglect of secondary education for black South Africans during the apartheid 
era, particularly in the former tribal homelands. Schools in poorer quintiles are far less likely to 
be located in an urban area, while the formerly white schools are concentrated in the wealthiest 
quintile. The student-teacher ratio is fairly similar across quintiles with the exception of the 
wealthiest quintile where it is substantially lower. These wealthy schools typically raise enough 
funds from school fees to be able to hire extra teachers in addition to their allocated government 
g posts. Schools in higher quintiles tend to be larger in terms of their enrollment level per 
school, while secondary schools are larger on average than primary schools in the same quintile.  
Fee data are presented for 2005, the last year in which they were collected13. The median 
annual school fee for primary schools is R50 (PPP US$19) per child. For secondary schools, the 
median fee increases to R130 (PPP US$49) per annum. Fees tend to be similar in magnitude 
across quintiles (with the exception of quintile 5), with secondary school fees being uniformly 
higher than the corresponding fees for primary schools. A crude calculation using data from the 
 
13 Fee data for the Western Cape were not available for 2005: the 2004 figures are used instead. 
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annual household income on average14. The figures are virtually identical if one calculates a 
separate figure for schools in each of the treated quintiles, quintile 1 and quintile 2, since fees 
and household income are proportionally higher. 
While these amounts are not particularly large, several points should be emphasized. 
First, these are per-child amounts: for households with many children of school-going age, the 
cumulative effect could be large. Second, school fees are often due up front at the start of each 
semester. For poor rural households who are credit constrained this could potentially be 
problematic. Finally, the median fee for secondary schools is more than double that for primary 
schools. For schools in the poorest quintile, it is more than three times as high. In addition, 
SGB’s in secondary schools are much more likely to have control over their allocated budget 
(“section 21 status”) which would increase the incentive for them to enforce payment of fees. A 
priori, one might therefore expect the effect of the school fee elimination to be higher for 
secondary schools, especially given the fact that initial levels of secondary enrollment were 
much lower.  
As a prelude to the more detailed analysis to follow, Figures 1a and 1b present the change 
in enrollment at an aggregated level. Each observation in Figure 1a represents one of the 60 
education districts in the seven provinces in the sample that contained at least one public primary 
school in 2007. The change in total primary school log enrollment between 2006 and 2007 for 
each district is plotted against the proportion of primary schools in that district that were declared 
no-fee. A fitted line and 95% confidence interval for the simple binary regression are shown, in 
                                                 
14 This calculation uses the 2001 census to assign to each treated school in the sample the median household income 
in the surrounding subplace (village or suburb), converted into 2005 rands. The 2005 school fee as a percentage of 
this income was then calculated for each school, and the mean taken over all treated schools.  
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which observations are weighted by the 2006 level of enrollment in each district. Figure 1b 
presents analogous results for secondary schools. The slope coefficient from this simple exercise 
is essentially equal to zero for primary schools. For secondary schools, the slope coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. The point estimate is 0.066 which implies that, on 
average, a district with 90% of its secondary schools treated would have experienced a 5.3% 
increase in enrollment relative to a district with 10% of its secondary schools treated. This first 
pass at the data suggests that, at a relatively high level of aggregation, secondary school 
enrollment did increase more in areas where the no-fee program was more widely implemented. 
Of course, these results are merely correlations and need not have any causal interpretation. The 
next two sections attempt to draw causal inferences on the program’s effects using the 
identification strategies discussed above.   
5. FE results 
a. Basic results 
Columns 1-3 of Table 3 present FE results for the full sample of primary schools (panel A) and 
secondary schools (panel B). The coefficients are those from applying the FE estimator to 
variants of equation (1), with  replaced by the interaction . Column 1 includes 
only a vector of year dummies as controls. Province-year dummies are added in column 2 and a 
time trend specific to the treated group is added in column 3. The full specification in column 3 
is therefore: 
ittreat 2007*iI
itiititit ItIprovY υδγμγμγα +++++= 2007*** 321     (4) 
where is the log of enrollment, itY tμ  is a vector of year fixed effects, tiprov μ*  is a vector of 
province-year fixed effects and  is a linear time trend specific to the treated group. The 
treatment group time trend is important to mitigate the possibility that we are identifying an 
ti *I
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effect that is merely a result of a pre-existing trend in enrollment that is unique to treated schools. 
The coefficient of interest is δ  which, under the FE approach, is identified solely from the 
variation in enrollment within schools over time.  
The addition of province-year fixed effects and the treatment group specific trend 
decreases the magnitude of the coefficient of interest for both primary and secondary schools. 
The treatment group time trend seems to be particularly important. Treated primary schools were 
experiencing a significant negative enrollment trend relative to untreated primary schools prior to 
the program while treated secondary schools were experiencing a significant positive trend. The 
opposite trends in primary and secondary schools could well be related if, for example, they are 
driven by a trend towards lower repetition rates in the upper grades of primary school in poor 
communities. Ignoring these pre-existing trends results in estimated treatment effects that are 
biased down for primary schools and biased up for secondary schools. With the full set of 
controls (column 3), the effect for primary schools in panel A of Table 3 is close to zero. On the 
other hand, the effect for secondary schools in panel B is a positive 1.8 percentage points in 
magnitude and is significant at the 1% level. This is in keeping with the fact that, as discussed 
earlier, enrollment in secondary schools was initially lower and the level of fees higher compared 
to primary schools. 
A natural question is whether the secondary school effect identified here is a “true” 
increase in enrollment of otherwise out of school children or whether it simply reflects transfers 
from untreated schools. Of course, the estimation techniques used here only identify the change 
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in enrollment relative to untreated schools and not the absolute change15. While direct data on 
school transfers is not available, several pieces of ancillary evidence suggest that transfers are 
not playing a major role here. First, since poor communities tend to be clustered together, treated 
and non-treated schools tend to be largely geographically isolated from one another. Any large-
scale transfers between treated and non-treated schools are therefore likely to be costly. Second, 
data from the March 2007 Labor Force Survey (LFS) indicate that, of those currently enrolled in 
each secondary school grade, around 97% did not move households in the previous year. These 
are identical to the Figures in the pre-program March 2006 LFS and even slightly higher than 
those in the March 2005 LFS. A story about the migration of children to (for example) move in 
with relatives located close to treated schools therefore does not seem plausible here.  
As a final check for migration, one can run similar regressions to the above to check 
whether enrollment in quintile 3 secondary schools experienced a different shock to quintile 4 
and 5 schools in 2007. If students were transferring schools, one would expect most of the 
transfers to come from quintile 3 schools, which are on average geographically closer to treated 
schools and likely to be closer substitutes16. These estimates (not shown) are effectively zero: 
quintile 3 secondary schools did not experience a drop in enrollment relative to schools in higher 
quintiles. Taken together, this evidence suggests that enrollment in secondary schools likely 
increased due to the program’s impact on the enrollment decision itself rather than through the 
impact on school choice for those who would have enrolled in any case.  
                                                 
15 One cannot infer the absolute change in enrollment directly using the coefficient on the year 2007 time dummy. In 
fact it is very difficult to interpret this coefficient due to the multiple omitted categories necessitated by collinearity 
between the various time dummies, interactions and trends in the full specification.   
16 As mentioned, the private sector is still very small (3% of total enrollments in 2006): transfers from private to 
public schools are unlikely to play much of a role here. 
 19
Panels A-E of Table 4 presents FE estimates for individual secondary school grades 
(grades 8-12), in order to investigate which grades are driving the overall secondary school 
effect. Once again column 1 includes year dummies, column 2 adds the full set of province-year 
dummies and column 3 adds a linear trend specific to the treated group. In the full specification 
of column 3, the impact on secondary enrollment appears to be concentrated in the earlier 
secondary school grades of 8-10. This impact is around 2.5 percentage points for grades 8 and 9 
(albeit only significant at the 10% level) and 3.0 percentage points for grade 10 (significant at the 
1% level). In contrast, the inclusion of the treatment group time trend reduces the estimates for 
grades 11 and 12 to close to zero and statistically insignificant.  The evidence using the national 
sample thus suggests that the secondary school effect is taking place in earlier secondary grades, 
particularly in grade 10 which is the first year of post-compulsory education17.  
It is interesting to note that administrative data suggest that the GER in grade 10 is 
unusually high compared to other secondary school grades (Department of Education, 2006b), 
which is typically taken as evidence of substantial grade retention at this level. This could be 
because the school curriculum tends to become noticeably more advanced in grade 10 and/or 
because of conscious “gate keeping” whereby schools block the progression of weak students at 
an early stage in order to avoid having them eventually take the matric exams in grade 12. These 
                                                 
17 The lack of a positive grade 12 effect addresses an obvious concern, namely that the secondary school impact 
could reflect a school-leaving (“matric”) exam shock. If these exams were unusually difficult in 2006 and the pass 
rate in poor schools is more sensitive to the difficulty level, more students than usual could have repeated in these 
schools in 2007. This would bias the estimated treatment effect up. Indeed, the national matric pass rate dropped 
from 68.3% in 2005 to 66.6% in 2006. However, the grade 12 effect is small, insignificant and negative in sign in 
specifications that use the full set of controls, suggesting that a matric exam shock is not driving the secondary 
school results. 
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academic difficulties in progressing past grade 10 could explain why enrollment in later 
secondary grades is less sensitive to school fees.  
b. Robustness checks 
The main concern with the panel data methods used here is that the treatment effect is identified 
simply as a shock to enrollment in treated schools in 2007. The analysis does control for 
differential trends in treated schools but any shock in 2007 that differentially affects treated 
schools will be part of the estimated treatment effect even if this is entirely unrelated to the no-
fee policy. One way to address this is to retain the full treatment group but restrict the 
comparison group to schools in quintile 3. A similar intuition to that underlying the RD design 
suggests that this should result in a comparison group that is more similar to the treatment group 
and less likely to experience different shocks unrelated to the no-fee policy. The results for 
restricting the sample in this way are presented in column 4 of Tables 3 and 4. The estimated 
treatment effects for both primary and secondary schools (Table 3) are virtually identical to the 
original estimates. Turning now to the specific secondary grades (Table 4), the estimate for grade 
8 increases substantially compared to the original estimate in column 3, while the estimates for 
grades 9 and 10 decrease in both magnitude and significance. The estimates for grades 11 and 
12, however, remain close to zero and insignificant as before. The overall primary and secondary 
results are therefore quantitatively robust to the selection of a more appropriate comparison 
group, while those for individual grades are less so but retain the same overall pattern as before. 
Another way to address the concern of other shocks is to augment equation (4) with the 
term , the interaction between the treatment group dummy and a year 2005 dummy. 
Since the no-fee policy was not in effect in 2005, one would expect to see no effect on the 
placebo dummy. Of course, this does not get directly at the issue of whether there was some 
2005*iI
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other unusual shock to treated schools in 2007, but rather gives an idea of how large such off-
trend shocks are in a “typical” year absent the no-fee policy18. The results (not shown) indicate 
that the coefficients on  for the primary and secondary samples are close to zero. The 
same is true if one runs the same estimates using quintile-year dummies instead. Other shocks 
unrelated to the no-fee program are therefore unlikely to be large enough to drive the effects 
identified here, although of course one cannot entirely rule out that such shocks may have 
occurred in 2007. 
2005*iI
        
As a final robustness check of the overall results, one can use an entirely different 
identification strategy that takes advantage of the level of geographical targeting. As described in 
section 2b, the poverty scores determining treatment were assigned predominantly (or at least 
partially) using census data at the ward level, a geographical division that typically encompasses 
many different suburbs or villages (“subplaces”)19. It is therefore possible that schools in two 
subplaces with similar observable characteristics would have been assigned a different treatment 
status since one subplace happened to be located in a ward that was less poor overall. Schools in 
the untreated subplace can therefore serve as the counterfactual for those in the treated subplace, 
allowing one to implement Heckman, Ichimura and Todd’s (1997) difference-in-differences 
                                         
18 It is important to retain  in equation (5) when running these falsification tests. Otherwise, if there is a 
positive effect on enrollment in 2007 and we ignore this term, the fitted treatment group time trend will be too steep. 
One could (and does) obtain significant negative estimates of  even though enrollment is simply 
following the true trend in the year 2005.   
2007*iI
2005*iI
19 There are 21243 subplaces and 3754 wards in South Africa. While subplace level data from the census are 
publicly available, wards are used for electoral purposes and are not part of the geographical hierarchy in the census. 
Ward level data are thus not readily available although they were calculated by Noble et al. (2006) specifically for 
use in poverty targeting. 
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matching estimator (see section c of the appendix for details). Nearest neighbor matching 
estimates, performed using the method of Abadie et al. (2004), are presented in Table 5. The 
estimates are largely insensitive to the number of nearest neighbors used for matching or to a 
regression adjustment for differences in covariates to reduce bias. They suggest a treatment 
effect of near zero for primary schools (the estimates are actually slightly negative) and a 
significant effect of around 2 percentage points for secondary schools – very similar to the 
previous estimates. 
c. Heterogeneous effects 
Several empirical studies have presented evidence suggesting that, even within poor countries, 
poorer households are substantially more sensitive to schooling costs in their enrollment 
decisions20. In the current context, heterogeneous effects can be investigated for the national 
sample of schools at the poverty quintile level. Accordingly, Table 6 replaces the single 
treatment dummy in the basic FE estimates with a treatment dummy for each of the two treated 
quintiles, quintile 1 and quintile 2. Column 1 includes only the vector of year dummies as 
controls, column 2 adds province-year dummies and column 3 adds a time trend specific to each 
treated quintile21. The estimates for the primary sample in panel A of Table 6 confirm that there 
was little differential change in enrollment in either of the treated quintiles once the quintile 
specific time trends are properly accounted for. The secondary school estimates in panel B are 
more interesting. In the full specification of column 3, the estimates suggest that the impact of 
the no-fee program was almost entirely concentrated in the poorer schools classified into quintile 
                                                 
20See for example Mingat and Tan (1986), Gertler and Glewwe (1990), Birdsall and Orival (1996) and Glick and 
Sahn (2006). 
21 One could include a time trend for each of the non-treated quintiles too: this makes no difference to the results. 
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1. The impact on enrollment in these schools in these specifications is 3.4 percentage points 
(significant at the 1% level), compared to a near zero estimate for quintile 2. These results 
suggest that the earlier estimates of almost 2 percentage points for secondary schools were an 
average of a much higher 2007 effect in quintile 1 schools and a near-zero effect in quintile 2 
schools.  
d. Comparison to other programs 
How does the estimated effect of around 2-3 percentage points for the South African no-fee 
program compared to other programs aimed at boosting enrollment in developing countries? 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) provide a recent meta-analysis of a common type of program, 
namely conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs. Not surprisingly, the impact of these 
programs on enrollment is highly context specific. Impacts tend to be highest (up to 31 
percentage points) for poorer countries, where baseline enrollment levels tend to be particularly 
low. Perhaps the more sensible comparison for South Africa is to several of the Latin American 
countries, which have more comparable levels of GDP per capita and baseline enrollment. The 
range of effects for CCT programs in these countries is between zero and 10 percentage points. 
Given that the size of the transfer in these settings (between 7 and 20 percent of per-capita 
expenditure) is much higher than the fee reduction in the South African program, the estimated 
impact of around 2-3 percentage points found here is quite respectable. The magnitudes are also 
in line with those for the Colombian fee reduction program evaluated in Barrera-Osorio et al. 
(2007), which has an impact of 3-6 percentage points on enrollment in a setting where baseline 




6. Heterogeneous effects with RD: Eastern Cape sample 
An alternative analysis of heterogeneous secondary school effects is possible for the sample of 
schools from the Eastern Cape province, since the exact poverty score awarded to each school 
was obtained for this sample. In particular, the sharp discontinuity in treatment status around the 
treatment cutoff can be used to implement an RD design in order to investigate the treatment 
effect for schools whose poverty score is in the vicinity of the cutoff.  
Since the sample has changed, Table 7 first repeats some of the earlier FE estimates on 
the Eastern Cape sample in order to provide a baseline22. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 7 present FE 
estimates for primary and secondary schools respectively that are analogous to those using the 
full specification of Table 3, only restricted to the Eastern Cape sample. Columns 2 and 4 
distinguish between the two treated quintiles and are analogous to the estimates for 
heterogeneous effects by quintile using the full specification of Table 6. In contrast to the 
national estimates, there is some evidence in favor of a small positive effect on primary 
enrollment in column 1 of Table 7, with the estimate 1.5 percentage points in magnitude and 
                                                 
22 Around 6.5% of Eastern Cape schools are not classified as “ordinary” schools by the provincial education 
department. The bulk of these (5.5% of the total schools) are “farm schools”. These schools are located on private 
land, typically a commercial farm, and were originally built during apartheid by white landowners to provide basic 
education to the children of their black laborers. Since the poverty score allocated to these schools likely reflected 
the status of the wealthy surrounding farming community rather than that of those actually attending the school, 
these schools were manually reassigned to quintile 2. Since their treatment status was not determined by the poverty 
score, the subsequent RD analysis drops these schools, together with the remaining 1% of schools not classified as 
“ordinary” by the provincial Department such as church schools. For comparability to the RD estimates, the 
estimates in Table 7 also omit these schools. For the earlier national analysis, the national department’s definition of 
“ordinary” schools – which includes farm schools – was used. 
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significant at the 5% level. The estimates with heterogeneous effects in column 2 suggest that 
any impact on primary school enrollment is concentrated almost entirely in quintile 1 schools.  
For the secondary school sample in column 3 of Table 7, the overall estimated impact of 
the program in the Eastern Cape is 3.2 percentage points (significant at the 5% level): far higher 
than the point estimate for the national sample in column 3 of Table 3. This makes sense given 
the fact that the Eastern Cape is one of the poorest provinces and had the lowest secondary and 
post-compulsory secondary enrollment ratios in the country in 2005 (72% and 65% 
respectively). For the estimates with heterogeneous effects in column 4, the coefficients suggest 
an increase in enrollment of 5.9 percentage points in quintile 1 secondary schools (significant at 
the 1% level) and no effect on enrollment in quintile 2 secondary schools. While the magnitude 
of the quintile 1 effect is much larger than for the national secondary school sample, the national 
pattern of heterogeneous effects seems to hold in the Eastern Cape in that the effects are 
concentrated entirely in the group of quintile 1 schools. 
Preliminary visual evidence in favor of heterogeneous effects using the detailed poverty 
score data is presented in Figure 2. The figure plots a quintic fit of the change in log enrollment 
between 2007 and 2006 against the poverty score for each Eastern Cape school, allowing for a 
break at the cutoff. This figure is analogous to RD estimates for 2007 log enrollment that use 
2006 log enrollment as a covariate and constrain its coefficient to unity. The advantage of 
presenting the figure in this way is that the change in enrollment in regions far from the 
treatment cutoff is made clear. The solid line in Figure 2 is the fit for the change in log 
enrollment in primary schools and is relatively flat across the domain of poverty scores. 
However, the slope does increase slightly towards the poorer schools in quintile 1, implying that 
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there may have been a small impact on enrollment in this subset of treated primary schools as 
suggested by the previous FE estimates.  
The dashed line in Figure 2 is the fit for secondary schools and suggests a large positive 
change in secondary enrollment, but again not in a homogeneous fashion. The change in 
secondary enrollment does not jump noticeably at the treatment cutoff, but instead begins to 
increase gradually a little past the cutoff. Towards the poorest quintile 1 schools, the change in 
secondary enrollment reaches a maximum and begins to decrease slightly. This could reflect the 
fact that, in the very poorest communities, the decrease in fees was not sufficient to overcome 
other barriers to enrollment such as a lack of access. In any case, Figure 2 is consistent with the 
FE estimates in that the change in secondary enrollment is small over the score range of quintile 
2 schools but large for the poorer quintile 1 schools. 
Figure 2 suggests that RD estimates of the jump at the discontinuity are likely to find that 
the program had small or zero effects on enrollment at any level. This is simply because these 
RD estimates are valid locally around the treatment cutoff between quintiles 2 and 3 where the 
least poor of the treated schools are located. In the presence of heterogeneous effects that are 
larger in poorer communities, these relatively wealthy schools could well experience no 
treatment effects. The remainder of this section focuses on the econometric evidence in support 
of this visual impression by checking the underlying assumptions behind the RD design and 
presenting RD estimates for enrollment.  
 a. First stage 
Figure 3 shows how the normalized poverty score of each Eastern Cape school is related to its 
quintile assignment. The figure suggests that, except for a handful of schools, ordinary public 
schools were indeed placed into the quintile suggested by their poverty score. This motivates the 
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use of the sharp RD design, in which having a normalized poverty score above zero (the cutoff 
between quintiles 2 and 3) determines treatment with no-fee status.  
In any RD design there may be a concern that agents can select in or out of treatment by 
manipulating the running variable (the poverty score in this case). If this is the case, the key 
underlying assumption of the RD design – namely that all characteristics but treatment status are 
continuous around the cutoff - may not hold23. The nature of the no-fee program suggests some 
financial incentive for poor schools to claim no-fee status, since such schools obtain an increase 
in the per-student allocation from the government that is supposed to be larger than the lost 
income from school fees. For example, one could imagine quintile 3 schools run by a hard-
working principal pressuring education department officials to change their score so as to 
become eligible for treatment. Although the level of discretion given to provinces in the final 
assignment of poverty scores may lead to serious concerns about score manipulation, this is less 
of an issue in the Eastern Cape where officials made direct use of the ward-level deprivation 
index computed independently by Noble et al. (2006). Moreover, since identification in the RD 
context focuses on schools near the cutoff, the concern is more specifically related to schools that 
may have manipulated their scores so as to become “just” eligible for the program. Figure 4 
displays a histogram of the number of schools observed in small bins of the poverty score. There 
is little visual evidence of the stacking that might be expected to the right of the cutoff if this was 
the case. 
b. Continuity checks 
In evaluating the plausibility of the underlying assumptions in the RD design, we would ideally 
verify that all characteristics determined prior to treatment are continuous at the cutoff. While it 
                                                 
23 See, for example, McCrary (2008). 
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is obviously not feasible to verify this for unobservable characteristics, it is essential do so for 
observable ones. For illustrative purposes consider the log of enrollment in 2006. Following 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the circles in Figure 5 represent bin averages for 2006 log 
enrollment. The open circles are for the sample of primary schools and the solid circles for 
secondary schools. The solid line plots fitted values of a regression of 2006 log enrollment on a 
quintic in the poverty score and a dummy for having a score greater than the cutoff for the 
sample of primary schools. This dummy allows for a break at the cutoff: any sharp changes in 
baseline 2006 enrollment could be a concern in the RD context. The dashed lines are fitted 
values for the same regression for the sample of secondary schools, around 15% of the total 
sample. Baseline enrollment displays a U-shaped relationship with the poverty score for primary 
schools and is generally lower than that of secondary schools with the same poverty score. With 
regards to identifying any breaks at the cutoff, the curves both appear to be smooth around the 
cutoff, supporting the RD approach.  
Table 8 presents corresponding statistical evidence for log enrollment and a variety of 
other school characteristics measured in 2006: the student-teacher ratio, the gender ratio and a 
binary variable for connection to the electricity grid. The table shows the results of regressions of 
the variable of interest on a polynomial in the poverty score and a dummy for being beyond the 
no-fee cutoff. The coefficients shown are for the dummy, which again represents a possible 
break at the cutoff. Columns 1-4 show the results for primary schools while columns 5-8 are for 
secondary schools. The polynomials in the normalized score range from cubic to quintic as 
indicated in the table. The quintic specification in columns 3 and 7 corresponds to the fitted 
curves in Figure 5. Some specifications (columns 4 and 8) also include an interaction between 
the treatment dummy and the poverty score to allow for a different slope either side of the cutoff. 
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For the primary school sample, the difference in the 2006 enrollment level across the cutoff is 
close to zero (albeit quite imprecisely estimated) once the control polynomial is quintic. With 
regards to the other baseline characteristics, the estimates of the differences in student-teacher 
ratio and probability of connection to the electricity grid become weakly statistically significant 
with the quintic specification, but remain relatively small in economic terms. Allowing for a 
change in slope across the cutoff yields very similar results; the straightforward quintic 
specification is therefore the preferred one. For the sample of secondary schools, the estimates 
for the jump in 2006 enrollment are similarly small and close to zero once higher order 
polynomials are used. The differences in the other secondary school baseline characteristics are 
also generally small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Overall, the point estimates 
using the preferred quintic specification suggest that the underlying assumption of similarity in 
baseline characteristics is plausible in the current setting.  
c. Results for enrollment 
Figure 6 illustrates fitted values from a regression of 2007 log enrollment in primary schools 
(solid line) and secondary schools (dashed line) on a quintic in the poverty score and a dummy 
for being beyond the no-fee cutoff. As in Figure 2 there appears to be little visual evidence of a 
jump around the cutoff, suggesting that the program did not substantially boost enrollment in 
treated schools of either level in the vicinity of the cutoff. The left hand panel of Table 9 presents 
corresponding statistical evidence for primary schools using a variety of specifications that 
correspond to versions of equation (3) using the preferred quintic polynomial to control for the 
poverty score. Column 1 presents the results of the simple regression of primary 2007 log 
enrollment on this quintic in the score and a treatment dummy. Column 2 adds the lagged level 
of enrollment as a control, while column 3 includes a variety of other baseline characteristics: the 
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gender ratio, student-teacher ratio and a dummy for an electricity connection. Finally, column 4 
adds six district dummies to the set of controls. Columns 5-8 repeat these regressions for the 
sample of secondary schools. Since the poverty score is not a continuous variable, standard 
errors are clustered by the poverty score following Lee and Card (2008), although in practice this 
makes little difference to the results here. 
The coefficient of interest, namely that on the treatment dummy, is always insignificant 
and slightly negative across most specifications for primary schools. Once the full set of controls 
is included, the point estimate is below 1 percentage point in absolute value and still negative in 
sign. There does not appear to be any evidence that the program had a positive effect on 
enrollment in the vicinity of the cutoff. The estimates for secondary schools are presented in the 
right hand panel of Table 9. The point estimates of interest are less precisely estimated than those 
for primary schools but are close to zero in all specifications, providing little evidence of a strong 
positive effect on enrollment.  
These estimates – together with the FE estimates broken down by treatment quintile – 
thus support the notion that school fees represented a barrier to secondary school enrollment, but 
only in poorer communities. Schools in quintile 2, particularly those relatively wealthy treated 
communities close to the treatment cutoff that are the focus of the RD estimates, experience 
virtually no treatment effect. On the other hand, the poorer quintile 1 schools experience 
relatively large and significant effects.  
7. Conclusion 
The estimates presented here have provided evidence on the impact of South Africa’s no-fee 
program on school enrollment. Compared to the across the board fee elimination programs 
implemented elsewhere, the geographical targeting of the South African program at poor 
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communities is an alternative that may prove attractive to countries aiming to reduce school fees 
in a manner compatible with their limited budgets. The national FE estimates suggest that the 
program had little effect on primary school enrollment, suggesting that school fees were not 
playing a major role in household schooling decisions at this level. The lack of a large primary 
school response is not surprising given that the initial level of fees was relatively low and 
enrollment was high. 
  On the other hand, the FE estimates suggest that the program did boost overall secondary 
school enrollment. For the national sample, the best estimate of this increase is just under 2 
percentage points. The evidence for individual grade enrollments, while weaker, suggests that 
these increases are concentrated in the earlier grades of secondary school. There is strong 
evidence in favor of substantial heterogeneity by community poverty so that enrollment is 
affected more in poorer communities. In fact, the overall national secondary effect consists of an 
increase of almost 3.5 percentage points in the poorer of the two treated quintiles diluted by a 
near-zero effect in the other. The presence of heterogeneous effects is also evident in the 
estimates for a provincial sample, for which RD estimates find a zero effect on secondary school 
enrollment for the relatively wealthy group of treated schools near the cutoff. On the other hand, 
FE estimates for the same sample suggest an increase of almost 6 percentage points due to the 
program in the poorer of the two treated quintiles located far from the cutoff score.  
The overall estimates are comparable to those for other subsidy-type programs in middle 
income countries, particularly CCT programs. The evidence thus indicates that secondary school 
enrollment in South Africa is somewhat sensitive to even modest schooling costs in particularly 
poor communities and that other interventions aimed at reducing costs (such as transport 
subsidies) might be effective if targeted at these communities using a similar method. However, 
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the estimates do suggest that more careful attention should be paid to the setting of the treatment 
cutoff in these initiatives in order to target the poorest communities. If the goal of the no-fee 
program was simply to increase enrollment for example, the cutoff for no-fee status could have 
been set at a far lower level and had a similar effect. Of course, one cannot conclude that fees 
were not burdensome to households simply because their enrollment decisions were unaffected 
by the program. In that sense, the more generous cutoff and accompanying increase in 
government funding may have had desirable redistributive effects. 
However, the results also suggest that efforts to substantially improve secondary school 
enrollment across a wider range of poor communities in South Africa – particularly in upper 
secondary grades where enrollment is most in need of improvement – should focus on other 
initiatives besides a simple fee reduction. While much progress has been made in equalizing and 
improving school resources since the end of apartheid, student performance on the matric exams 
and international tests such as TIMMS indicate that average school quality remains poor24. An 
obvious possibility is therefore that children are choosing not to enroll in secondary school since 
poor school quality offers low returns to the investment in schooling or that they are simply 
unable to attain the required academic standard to progress to higher secondary grades.  
A recent paper by Lam, Ardington and Leibbrandt (2008) uses a panel dataset from a 
large South African city to confirm that repetition and failure rates in formerly black urban 
schools are very high. At least in the urban context, it does indeed appear that many students in 
poor communities experience severe academic difficulties in secondary school grade 
                                                 
24 Almost 35% of candidates failed the national matric (grade 12) exams in 2006, while only 17% of candidates 
attained the basic standard necessary for university admission (“matric exemption”). South Africa also ranked 




progression. One would therefore expect a reduction in schooling costs to play only a limited 
role in increasing secondary school enrollment in this setting, particularly in higher grades. The 
no-fee program may have another role to play here, since it entails an effective increase in 
funding for poor schools. Whether or not this will eventually translate into an improvement in 
quality that could feed back into increased enrollment is an interesting issue for future research.
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Table 1: Poverty distribution table for allocation of schools to poverty quintiles 
Province Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total
Eastern Cape 34.8 21.6 21.0 11.6 10.9 100.0
Free State 30.8 14.9 20.1 18.8 15.4 100.0
KwaZulu-Natal 24.2 18.8 25.6 17.3 14.1 100.0
Gauteng 10.5 11.4 27.4 27.2 23.6 100.0
Limpopo 34.0 22.3 24.9 11.6 7.2 100.0
Mpumalanga 16.7 20.2 29.8 19.9 13.5 100.0
North West 22.7 15.2 30.5 20.5 11.0 100.0
Northern Cape 26.3 17.7 21.6 14.8 19.6 100.0
Western Cape 6.5 8.0 23.1 27.7 34.6 100.0
South Africa 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 100.0  
Notes: Q1-Q5 refers to national poverty quintile. Entries are the percentage of students in each 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics for ordinary public schools  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All
N 4469 2821 2686 1265 1046 12287
2006 enrollment 286.2 322.2 430.9 587.0 608.0 384.7
(254.1) (280.3) (303.7) (339.1) (305.7) (308.0)
2006 student-teacher ratio 28.5 28.6 29.9 30.4 24.9 28.7
(9.7) (8.2) (7.3) (6.9) (7.2) (8.5)
2006 gender ratio 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.06 1.02 1.08
(0.26) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.21)
Urban 0.07 0.11 0.30 0.73 0.80 0.26
Formerly white 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.63 0.08
Section 21 status 0.52 0.58 0.60 0.71 0.81 0.60
2005 fees (Rand)
25% 20 20 30 50 220 25
50% 30 40 50 80 1900 50
75% 50 60 75 160 3000 70
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All
N 855 727 972 494 497 3545
As proportion of total schools 
in qunitile
0.16 0.20 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.22
2006 enrollment 508.3 575.3 718.9 988.6 925.8 707.3
(307.4) (360.6) (391.2) (387.1) (346.6) (400.0)
2006 student-teacher ratio 31.2 30.7 30.8 31.0 24.7 30.0
(7.2) (6.7) (6.5) (5.6) (6.2) (6.9)
2006 gender ratio 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.88 0.92
(0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
Urban 0.14 0.17 0.32 0.78 0.85 0.39
Formerly white 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.63 0.12
Section 21 status 0.96 0.94 0.76 0.82 0.92 0.87
2005 fees (Rand)
25% 75 100 100 100 450 100
50% 100 120 120 190 2800 130
75% 130 150 160 350 4200 225
Panel A: Primary schools
Panel B: Secondary schools
 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Q1-Q5 refers to national poverty quintile. Upper 
and lower 1% of observations excluded as outliers for 2006 enrollment, 2006 student-teacher 
ratio and 2006 gender ratio. 
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Table 3: FE estimates for log enrollment – national sample. 
Omit Q4 
and Q5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I*2007 -0.039*** -0.017*** 0.005 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
I*t -0.009*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
year dummies Y Y Y Y
province-year dummies N Y Y Y
N 57818 57818 57818 46845
I*2007 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
I*t 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.004)
year dummies Y Y Y Y
province-year dummies N Y Y Y
N 16382 16382 16382 11683
Full sample 
Panel A: Primary schools
Panel B: Secondary schools
 
 
Notes: Coefficients are from FE estimation with school log enrollment in each year from 2003-
2007 as the dependent variable. Independent variables are as indicated in the table.  is 
the interaction between a dummy for no-fee status and a 2007 dummy (the year of 
implementation).  is a linear time trend specific to the group of no-fee schools. Schools with 
the 2006/2007 change in enrollment below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile for each 
sub sample were omitted as outliers. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *significant at 




Table 4: FE estimates for log enrollment by grade – national secondary school sample. 
Omit Q4 
and Q5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I*2007 0.053*** 0.014 0.024* 0.040**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
I*t -0.004 0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
N 13789 13789 13789 9343
I*2007 0.022** 0.011 0.025* 0.017
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
I*t -0.006 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
N 13972 13972 13972 9458
I*2007 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.024*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
I*t 0.004 0.007
(0.004) (0.005)
N 16626 16626 16626 11871
I*2007 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.004 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
I*t 0.012*** 0.011**
(0.005) (0.006)
N 16548 16548 16548 11804
I*2007 0.091*** 0.046*** -0.011 0.003
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
I*t 0.023*** 0.015**
(0.006) (0.007)
N 16450 16450 16450 11732
year dummies Y Y Y Y
province-year dummies N Y Y Y
Panel E: Grade 12
Full secondary school sample 
Panel A: Grade 8
Panel B: Grade 9
Panel C: Grade 10
Panel D: Grade 11
 
 
Notes: Coefficients are from FE estimation with school-grade log enrollment in each year from 
2003-2007 as the dependent variable. Independent variables are as indicated in the table. 
 is the interaction between a dummy for no-fee status and a 2007 dummy (the year of 
implementation).  is a linear time trend specific to the group of no-fee schools. Schools with 
the 2006/2007 change in enrollment below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile for each 
grade were omitted as outliers. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *significant at 10%, 




Table 5: Matching estimates – national sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect 0 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Nearest neighbors 1 3 5 1 3 5
Bias adjustment N N N Y Y Y
Obs. 11237 11237 11237 11237 11237 11237
Treatment effect 0.020** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.017** 0.020*** 0.019***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Nearest neighbors 1 3 5 1 3 5
Bias adjustment N N N Y Y Y
Obs. 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246
Panel A: Primary schools
Panel B: Secondary schools
 
 
Notes: Nearest neighbor estimates of average treatment effect on the treated performed using the 
“nnmatch” command in Stata (Abadie et. al., 2004). Matching covariates (subplace-level) are: 
log average income, unemployment rate, employment rate, proportion without any secondary 
education, proportion with a secondary school diploma (matric), proportion with a toilet, 
proportion with access to piped water and proportion with electricity in the home. Bias 
adjustment refers to the option for regression adjustment of estimates based on difference in 
covariates (the matching covariates were used here). Schools with the 2006/2007 change in 
enrollment below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile for each sub sample were omitted 
as outliers. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1% levels. 
 41
Table 6: Heterogeneous effects by quintile - national sample. 
(1) (2) (3)
Q1*2007 -0.047*** -0.014*** 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Q2*2007 -0.028*** -0.020*** 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Q1*t and Q2*t N N Y
year dummies Y Y Y
province-year dummies N Y Y
N 57818 57818 57818
Q1*2007 0.072*** 0.061*** 0.034***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Q2*2007 0.036*** 0.028*** -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Q1*t and Q2*t N N Y
year dummies Y Y Y
province-year dummies N Y Y
N 16382 16382 16382
Full sample
Panel A: Primary schools
Panel B: Secondary schools
 
Notes: Coefficients are from FE estimation with school log enrollment as the dependent variable. 
Independent variables are as indicated in the table.  is the interaction between a 
quintile 1 dummy and a 2007 dummy (the year of implementation).  is a linear time trend 
specific to quintile 1 schools. Identical terms for quintile 2 schools are denoted by . Schools 
with the 2006/2007 change in enrollment below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile for 
each sub sample were omitted as outliers. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *significant 






Table 7: FE estimates - Eastern Cape ordinary schools. 







I*t Y N Y N
Q1*t and Q2*t N Y N Y
year dummies Y Y Y Y




Notes: Coefficients are from FE estimation with school log enrollment as the dependent variable. 
Independent variables are as indicated in the table.  is the interaction between a dummy 
for no-fee status and a 2007 dummy (the year of implementation).  is a linear time trend 
specific to the group of no-fee schools. is the interaction between a quintile 1 dummy 
and a year 2007 dummy.  is a linear time trend specific to quintile 1 schools. Identical 
terms for quintile 2 schools are denoted by Q . Schools with the 2006/2007 change in 
enrollment below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile were omitted as outliers. Robust 








Table 8: Continuity checks for baseline variables in the RD design (Eastern Cape ordinary 
schools) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Score polynomial Cubic Quartic Quintic Quintic Cubic Quartic Quintic Quintic
2006 log enrollment 0.071 0.07 0.009 0.002 0.051 0.003 0.005 0.006
(0.059) (0.058) (0.071) (0.070) (0.107) (0.111) (0.125) (0.125)
2006 gender ratio 0.01 0.01 0.007 0.008 0.048 0.067 0.03 0.049
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.042) (0.043) (0.051) (0.049)
2006 teacher ratio -0.526 -0.56 -1.634** -1.678** 1.477 0.787 -0.293 -0.306
(0.630) (0.627) (0.756) (0.750) (1.458) (1.558) (1.694) (1.734)
2006 electricity 0.005 0.006 0.067* 0.072* -0.018 0.003 0.03 0.052
(0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041) (0.058) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066)
I*score N N N Y N N N Y
N (2006 log enrol.) 4187 4187 4187 4187 762 762 762 762
Primary schools Secondary schools
 
 
Notes: Coefficients are from OLS regressions of each baseline characteristic on I , a dummy for 
having a poverty score above the no-fee cutoff of zero and a polynomial in the poverty score (of 
the order indicated). Columns 4 and 8 include the interaction between I  and the poverty score. 
For each baseline characteristic, observations with the dependent variable below the 1st 
percentile or above the 99th percentile were omitted as outliers. Standard errors are in 




Table 9: RD estimates of effect of the program on 2007 enrollment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Score polynomial Quintic Quintic Quintic Quintic Quintic Quintic Quintic Quintic
I 0.007 -0.012 -0.011 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 0.001
(0.157) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.172) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021)
2006 log enrollment N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
2006 gender ratio N N Y Y N N Y Y
2006 teacher ratio N N Y Y N N Y Y
2006 electricity N N Y Y N N Y Y
District dummies N N N Y N N N Y
N 4189 4188 4179 4179 764 763 761 761
Primary schools Secondary schools
 
 
Notes: Coefficients are from OLS regressions of school log enrollment in 2007 on I , a dummy 
for having a poverty score above the no-fee cutoff of zero; a quintic polynomial in the poverty 
score; and various baseline characteristics measured in 2006 as indicated. Columns 4 and 8 also 
include the full set of education district dummies. Observations with 2007 enrollment below the 
1st percentile or above the 99th percentile for each sub sample were omitted as outliers. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered by poverty score: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 





Figure 1a: Change in log enrollment and proportion of 
no-fee schools by education district (primary schools)
Figure 1b: Change in log enrollment and proportion of 
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Notes: Each dot represents an education district. The lines 
are for a simple binary regression and a 95% confidence 
interval. Observations are weighted by the level of 
enrollment in 2006 using the “aweight” command in Stata. 
The slope coefficient is -0.004 with a standard error of 
0.008. 
Notes: Each dot represents an education district. The lines 
are for a simple binary regression and a 95% confidence 
interval. Observations are weighted by the level of 
enrollment in 2006 using the “aweight” command in Stata. 













Figure 2: 2007/2006 change in log enrollment versus 
normalized poverty score for Eastern Cape ordinary 
schools 
Figure 3: School quintile assignment and normalized 
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Notes: The open circles are bin averages for primary 
schools, the solid circles for secondary schools. The solid 
line is the regression of 2007/2006 change in log enrollment 
for primary schools on a quintic in the score and a dummy 
for being beyond the cutoff using individual school 
observations. The dashed line is the regression for 
secondary schools. Schools with 2007/2006 change in 
enrollments below the 1st percentile and above the 99th 
percentile were dropped as outliers. Q1 and Q2 demarcate 
the region of quintile 1 and quintile 2 schools respectively. 
Notes: Each vertical line represents the poverty score cutoff 
between quintiles. Each dot represents a school. 
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Figure 4: Histogram of the normalized poverty score for 
Eastern Cape ordinary schools 
Figure 5: 2006 log enrollment versus normalized 
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Notes: Schools are in bins of size 0.02. The vertical line at 
zero represents the cutoff between quintiles 2 and 3: schools 
to the right are no-fee.   
Notes: The open circles are bin averages for primary 
schools, the solid circles for secondary schools. The solid 
line is the regression of 2006 primary school log enrollment 
on a quintic in the score and a dummy for being beyond the 
cutoff of zero using individual school observations. The 
dashed line is the regression for secondary schools. Schools 
with 2006 enrollment below the 1st percentile and above the 
99th percentile were dropped as outliers. 
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       primary schools 
- - - secondary schools 
Notes: The circles are bin averages for primary schools, the 
solid circles for secondary schools. The solid line is the 
regression of 2007 primary school log enrollment on a 
quintic in the score and a dummy for being beyond the 
cutoff of zero using individual school observations. The 
dashed line is the regression for secondary schools. Schools 
with 2007 enrollments below the 1st percentile and above 
the 99th percentile were dropped as outliers. 
Figure 6: 2007 log enrollment versus normalized 

















a. Sample composition 
The data provided by the national Department of Education contained information on the 
universe of public schools in South Africa. Of the 29171 public schools on the system, 25129 
reported positive total enrollment in 2007. The remaining 4042 may well be schools that closed 
but remained on the system, since many of these had no enrollment information in the previous 
few years either. In addition, schools could only be used as observations in the regressions if 
their quintile (and hence treatment status) could be determined. No quintile information was 
available for schools in two out of the nine provinces: KwaZulu-Natal (around 23% of the total 
sample) and North West (around 8% of the total sample). In the other provinces, only a few 
schools – at most 22 per province - did not have this information available. As discussed in 
section b below, some schools were also omitted from the final sample since it was difficult to 
classify them as primary or secondary schools. The final sample therefore consists of 15832 
schools in seven of the nine provinces which reported positive enrollment in 2007, had quintile 
information available on the system and could be classified as primary or secondary schools. 
b. Classification of schools 
The standard classification of public schools in South Africa has primary schools offering grades 
1-7 and secondary schools offering grades 8-12. There is a third category known as “combined” 
schools which typically offer grades 1-9 (i.e. the grades comprising compulsory education) and 
are concentrated predominantly in the Eastern Cape province. However, around 31% of schools 
do not follow this neat classification scheme. For example, some schools only offer the post-
compulsory grades while others are particularly small and offer only a few primary grades. For 
the purposes of the analysis in this paper, primary schools are classified as those terminating at 
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or before grade 7. Combined schools are counted as primary schools throughout the paper, since 
their grades largely overlap with primary school grades25. Secondary schools are those 
commencing at grade 8 or above and terminating at grade 12. This classification scheme leaves 
around 7% of the schools as unclassified, the bulk of which are schools offering all grades 1-12. 
Since the difference in effects between primary and secondary schools is a key feature of the 
analysis and these schools cannot be readily classified into either category, they have been 
dropped from the sample. For 2007, this approach yields a sample consisting of 12287 “primary” 
schools (of which 22% are combined schools) and 3545 secondary schools. 
c. Matching estimator 
A basic version of the difference-in-differences matching estimator introduced by Heckman, 
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where  is the log enrollment in school i  in year  with treatment status , is 
the number of treated schools and  is the number of untreated schools (indexed by k ) matched 
to treatment school i . Effectively this estimator uses the average change in enrollment for the set 
of untreated schools matched to each treated school as the relevant counterfactual. Traditional 
cross-sectional matching estimators that focus only on ex-post outcomes assume that, 
conditioning on a set of observables, mean outcomes are conditionally mean independent of 
treatment. The advantage of using a difference-in-differences type matching estimator instead is 
that it only requires conditional mean independence for the change in outcomes. This allows for 
time invariant unobserved differences by treatment status. For implementation here, each school 
)( itit treatY t ittreat N
in
                                                 
25 Omitting combined schools makes little difference to the results for the primary school sample. 
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was first linked to a subplace using its GPS coordinates. Nearest neighbor matches were then 
selected for each treated school based on a vector of subplace-level covariates and matching 
estimates obtained as described in Abadie et al. (2004). These are the estimates that are 
presented in Table 5 and discussed in section 5b.  
 
 
